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Abstract
In this paper I explore the underlying mechanisms of the changes in public discourse with
respect to the issue of racial equality that have been observed in the United States over
the course of its history, with a particular focus on the changes that occurred in the latter
half of the twentieth century. Specifically, I provide a formal model of social interactions
in which agents are assigned to non-homophilic networks, are heterogeneous with respect
to preferences for equality between the races, and have preferences both to express their
true preferences and to not appear deviant from the group. In a series of numerical exper-
iments, results indicate that the probability of a transition in norms from an equilibrium
around inequality to an equilibrium around equality is increasing in the size of the minority
population and decreasing in the size of groups to which individuals are assigned.
∗Prepared for delivery at the 4th Annual Political Networks Conference, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
June 17–18, 2011.
†Ph.D. student, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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Introduction
In the twentieth century, the United States underwent a massive cultural shift. Norms of public
discourse with respect to racial equality were completely reversed. The idea that the races could
and should be considered social and political equals went from being a view rarely communicated
outside of a small number of intimate social groups to being the only acceptable mode of public
expression regarding race. This transformation has been deep, wide, and pervasive, effecting
large-scale change in discourse across virtually all contexts of public communication. In most
white social circles—in casual friendships, in school, in the workplace, in politics—whereas open
expression of racial egalitarianism had once been a cause for social censure, eventually any state-
ments of an inegalitarian nature would be met with strong disapproval, and could potentially
cause irreparable damage to a reputation.
An area where the transition in norms is particularly evident is in speech related to political
competition. In the latter years of the nineteenth century, the vast majority of candidates for
political office in the United States could anticipate strong challenges from their political rivals
and possible retribution from the voting public for espousing a personal view of racial equality.
From the first years of the twentieth century to well past the mid-century mark (in most local
areas), white politicians and members of the mass public alike would be subject to varying
degrees of admonishment for advocating the advancement of blacks’ social and political rights,
the integration of public and private institutions, equal employment and housing opportunities
for blacks, or any other measures that would breach the white-dominated racial hierarchy. By
contrast, in the latter years of the twentieth century, the idea of racial equality was virtually
universal in mainstream political discourse. Changing at varying rates across localities, and
undergoing a process of progression and digression depending on the social and political climate
of the day, it is readily apparent that the transition in norms with respect to socially acceptable
speech regarding race is now complete. In modern American politics, any discourse even bordering
on racial insensitivity is sure to be met with vociferous denunciation from a wide swath of powerful
organized interests.
The scope of this cultural change is difficult to understate. The body politic of the United
States in the twentieth century experienced a complete displacement of a prevailing social norm
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that had helped to define and constrain both mass and elite rhetoric since the founding of the
nation. From establishment, through the Civil War, through Reconstruction, and into the twen-
tieth century, agreement on the inherent superiority of whites over African Americans was a
necessary condition for entry into national, state, and most local politics. In particular, for the
vast majority of white elected officials of the Southern United States, at least a nominal defense
of racial separation was necessary until the 1960s, and, in some cases, beyond. The necessity
of these political stances was a direct consequence of the then-prevailing social norm of racial
inequality. In rapid historical fashion, however, the idea of racial equality, once held by only an
extremely small minority of the population, grew in the latter half of the twentieth century to be
the prevailing social norm, thereby displacing the norm of racial inequality.
That this shift in American culture has occurred is virtually incontrovertible. But given
the status quo of American thought on matters of racial differences (and particularly of white
racial attitudes) in the mid-twentieth century, the complete turnaround by the century’s end
certainly does not appear to be a priori self-evident. In fact, given the level of expressed white
resistance to the idea of blacks as social and political equals, and the widespread willingness of
elites to exploit and take on leadership roles in that resistance for electoral gains, the eventual
entrenchment of the norm of racial equality is a puzzling phenomenon. The rapidity with which
the change occurred is even more profound. And the implications for American politics have been
far-reaching, permeating social interactions between and among elites and masses, changing the
nature of political campaigns nationwide, altering the cleavage structure of major-party political
competition, and helping to redefine the coalitions of electoral support for the major political
parties.
How did this process of norm displacement occur and, just as importantly, how did it occur so
quickly? In this paper, I address an important piece of the answer to these question by situating
the process of the displacement of norms of public speech within a broader story of cultural evolu-
tion and focusing on the theoretical impact of network structure on the motivations of individuals.
In particular, I explore individual agents’ sometimes competing desires to publicly express views
that are consistent with their own internal preferences on the one hand, and to maintain social
standing within their networks of social relationships on the other. Under a system of homophilic
2
selection into networks of relationships within a population that is relatively homogeneous with
respect to internal preferences, desires for internal consistency and social acceptance are unlikely
to be in tension. However, when institutional mechanisms construct non-homophilic networks
of interactions, these two desires may frequently be opposed. When individuals are forced to
interact with non-familiar others, and when exogenous events lead individuals to be relatively
uncertain about the distribution of preferences in the population, it is reasonable to expect that
publicly expressed opinions may not necessarily comport with privately held values. Individual
idiosyncracies in estimating the distribution of preferences along with the desire to maintain so-
cial status may establish conditions conducive to the rapid transition from one norm of public
expression to another. And importantly, the evolution of norms of public expression can occur
independently of any changes in internal values.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the following section I briefly discuss the historical context
of the norm change that is the basis of my theoretical perspective in order to provide a direct
link between the substantive phenomenon and the more abstract model presented herein. Fol-
lowing this, I situate the individual-level mechanisms at play in the theory within the broader
social scientific literature on cultural evolution and social pressures to develop insights into the
individual-level mechanisms underlying key aspects of the dynamics of norms of public speech.
Then, I present a simplified model that formalizes these individual-level mechanisms and some of
the features of social structure within small-scale institutions that are thought to be important
components to norms of public discourse on sensitive social issues. After this, I use the model to
perform numerical experiments that demonstrate how the proposed individual-level mechanisms
lead to population-level outcomes as a function of two key parameters. Following the numerical
experiments, I offer concluding remarks.
The Norm of Racial Equality in Public Speech
As stated previously, the transition from a norm of racial inequality to a norm of racial equality in
public speech has permeated all levels of society, having failed to penetrate only a small minority
of closed social groups. In the most general terms, the process of change unfolded over a period of
several hundreds of years, operating at a relatively slow overall rate for much of U.S. history, and
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finally achieving a rapid pace in the latter half of the twentieth century (see, e.g., Mendelberg
2001, chs. 2 and 3 for a more detailed historical development). Accepting this description as
an accurate characterization of the macro-level process of norm transition does not preclude
the existence of significant variation in the pace of micro-level change. In fact, the society-wide
displacement of the norm of racial inequality by the norm of racial equality was marked by different
rates of piecemeal progression and digression across social groupings and geographic locations.
Over time, the complex relationship between elite leadership, public opinion, and mass political
action gradually advanced the social and political rights of African Americans and established an
ever-changing set of legal codes and institutions that structure interracial interactions.
With respect to changes in institutions, of particular significance was the patchwork of public
policies aimed at desegregating previously racially segregated institutions. Policies to combat
racial discrimination in various aspects of society along with the eventual vigorous enforcement of
judicial orders to desegregate schools led to a system of interracial contacts that had previously
been unimaginable. A great deal of research has been conducted on how policies to desegregate
have impacted the system of interracial interactions (e.g., Clotfelter 2004; Orfield 1969, 1983;
Orfield and Monfort 1992) and how changes in interracial contacts have in turn impacted a
variety of individual and social outcomes (e.g., Granovetter 1986; Patchen 1982). But no work
has focused on the specific impact that changes in the degree and character of interracial contacts
has had on the social acceptability of speech espousing racial inequality. In survey research on
racial attitudes, the potential social desirability biases of direct measures are widely known and
often mentioned, but a coherent theory or body of empirical evidence on the origin of such biases
is absent.
Micro-level Cultural Transmission: Small Groups and So-
cial Conformity
To develop a model of the micro-level process of norm development and evolution that has general
appeal, and that can be readily applied to the case of the United States, I begin with the assump-
tion that conformist transmission (also referred to as frequency-dependent bias) is adaptive under
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a wide range of conditions. That is, rather than develop a specific model of the genetic develop-
ment of conformist transmission in humans, I appeal to the literature with respect to its origins
and dynamics (Boyd and Richerson 1985, 2005; Henrich 2001; Henrich and Boyd 1998, 2001) and
begin at the starting point of conformist transmission as a pervasive human phenomenon. In
brief, conformist transmission is the tendency of individuals in a population to acquire a particu-
lar cultural variant due to the relative frequency of that variant among the individuals’ cultural
“parents” (Boyd and Richerson 1985, p. 10). Boyd and Richerson (1985, 2005) and Henrich and
Boyd (2001) note that conformist transmission is not identical to the concept of social conformity
as it has typically been examined in social psychology (e.g., Asch 1951; Sherif 1935), and the
difference is rooted in the motivation of individual agents. Specifically, conformist transmission
results in the adoption of cultural traits that are popular because individuals use popularity as an
indirect measure of a trait’s value. Social conformity, on the other hand, results in the adoption
of traits that are popular because individuals consciously try to avoid appearing deviant (Henrich
and Boyd 2001). The former represents an internalization of a cultural variant, while the latter
can be a simple change in observable behavior unaccompanied by internal changes.
If we consider norms of public speech to be cultural variants, the distinction between the
concepts of conformist transmission and social conformity becomes murky. It is plausible to
think that changes in public speech with respect to a social referent can and do occur without
always being accompanied by an associated change in internal attitudes with respect to that
same referent. Using the characterization of Henrich and Boyd (2001), such a process would
suggest that patterns of public speech at the micro level could be the result of social conformity.
At the macro level, however, large-scale changes in norms of public speech with respect to a
social referent are the result of a broad internalization of what does and what does not constitute
deviant behavior. Notice that I am not claiming that changes in norms of public speech must be
accompanied by large-scale shifts in attitudes. Rather, I am explicitly maintaining a distinction
between public speech and internal attitudes. Further, though it is clear that public speech and
internal attitudes with respect to the same social referents must be related in some ways, it is
also reasonable to expect that certain environmental conditions may cause the two to evolve on
different—and sometimes even opposing—trajectories. Specifying those conditions theoretically
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and deriving empirical implications are some of the goals of the present study.
The substantive situation of interest here is one in which a transition occurred to from one
norm of public speech to another. I contend that a major factor in this transition was widespread
social conformity at the level of the small group. Following Sherif (1935) and Asch (1951), a long
line of research in social psychology and related fields has demonstrated that social conformity is in
fact empirically verifiable in the laboratory. Sherif (1935, 1936) employed an optical illusion known
as the autokinetic effect (Adams 1912), in which a stationary pinpoint of light is projected onto the
wall of a darkened room, and to almost all human observers, the light appears to move. Employing
confederates, Sherif demonstrated that experimental subjects were quite susceptible to the power
of suggestion with respect to judgments about how far the light had traveled. That is, when
subjects were placed in a group setting and asked to publicly express their estimation of how far
the light had traveled after confederates had already done so, the judgments of subjects tended to
fall in line with those of the confederates, even when the expressed judgments of confederates were
wildly different than baselines established in a control condition. The Sherif studies demonstrated
that when humans are asked to express judgments about relatively ambiguous phenomena, there
is a strong tendency to look to the majority opinion as a rule of thumb for the appropriate
response.
But what about relatively unambiguous phenomena? Working in the tradition of Sherif (1935,
1936), Asch (1951, 1952) examined social conformity in situations in which the judgment task had
clear right and wrong answers. Specifically, subjects in the Asch studies were asked to express
which among a set of drawn lines was identical in length to another drawn line. Line lengths were
purposely drawn so that subjects would easily be able to differentiate their lengths, and subjects
making the judgment in an isolated control condition rarely expressed the wrong answer. Again,
subjects were placed in a group setting and asked to express their judgment out loud, this time
following a group of confederates who expressed the wrong answer. Though a majority of subjects
gave the correct response in this group condition, a surprisingly large proportion of subjects gave
the same wrong answer as the group of confederates. Given little evidence that the subjects
examined by Asch (1951, 1952) were unsure about the correct answer, the results point to a
strong tendency for humans in public settings to conform to expectations about the appropriate
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social response.
Scholars in a variety of fields have argued over how to interpret the results from these research
programs, with some asserting that subjects are publicly complying with the group while privately
maintaining a different viewpoint (e.g., Kiesler and Kiesler 1969), and others contending that
subjects are unsure about the correct answer and are using the views of fellow group members
to learn the the appropriate response (e.g., Thelen, Dollinger, and Kirkland 1979). Boyd and
Richerson (1985), on the other hand, argue convincingly that one should leverage the difference
in the level of ambiguity between the two decision-making tasks and that doing so may lead
to different conclusions about the phenomenon exhibited by subjects. Specifically, since the
judgment situation under study in the Asch experiments has an answer that is clearly correct,
while the judgment situation from the Sherif experiments does not, it may be the case subjects
who conform to the view of the confederates in the Asch experiments are exhibiting mere public
compliance, while subjects who conform in the Sherif experiments are exhibiting a form of social
learning.
While the results from the research programs spawned by Asch and Sherif are extremely useful
as the largest and most prominent collection of empirical evidence on small-group conformity, it
is not clear whether the type of conformity demonstrated has a direct connection to norms of
public speech with respect to salient social referents (including race), which are the focus of
the present study. In particular, the typical decision-making task under examination in these
studies is highly arbitrary, and cannot reasonably be expected to carry any social significance
for the subject outside of the laboratory. In one way, this can be seen as a strength of the
experimental designs in that the researcher is able to eliminate subjects’ preconceived notions
about particular referents. In another way, however, if we consider those preconceptions to be
worthy of study in their own right, and if we consider the clear qualitative difference between
expressed judgments on arbitrary tasks and expressions of opinion on salient—and sometimes
sensitive—attitudinal measures, existing work on social conformity leaves open the question of
how small-group pressures might operate on norms of public speech regarding race. Since a
variety of studies have provided evidence that expression of opinions is influenced by individual
perceptions of the aggregate distribution of opinions in the society at large (e.g., Mutz 1998;
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Noelle-Neumann 1974, 1984), and that the use of mass media information and opinion formation
within social groups are often subject to the influence of opinion leaders (e.g., Katz 1957; Katz
and Lazarsfeld 1955; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948), it seems plausible to think that the
type of social conformity demonstrated by Asch and Sherif with respect to arbitrary judgment
tasks may also operate on salient attitudinal measures. But there currently is no body of empirical
evidence to support this idea.
Of particular significance for norms of public speech with respect to race is the question of
whether changes in norms of public speech are necessarily tied to changes in internal attitudes. I
argue that norms of public speech with respect to race and internal attitudes with respect to race
need not evolve at the same rate or even in the same direction. And in fact, early in a process of
norm transition it is plausible to think that they do not. In a large body of work, Kuran (1987,
1989, 1990, 1991, 1995), has used formal logic, anecdotal accounts, and qualitative analysis of
political events to argue convincingly that individual public compliance with a belief that is in-
congruent with internal attitudes is a theoretically plausible phenomenon. At the individual level,
one can think of agents earning a type of expressive benefit by stating publicly their true prefer-
ences with respect to social referents and incurring a type of expressive cost by stating publicly a
view that goes against the majority opinion (Kuran 1995). The primary mechanisms leading to
these costs and benefits are negative and positive reinforcement by other group members. Under
very general circumstances, it can be shown that norms of public compliance that run counter to
some or all of a group’s members’ internal attitudes can persist if the costs of going against the
group are sufficiently high, and that factors exogenous to the group can lead norms to transition.
The dynamics of norms of public speech at the level of the small group, as they have been
presented here, can be summarized as follows. Norms of public discourse are developed and main-
tained through a process of social learning and cultural transmission. Over successive instances of
publicly expressing one’s opinion with respect to a particular social referent (e.g., race), individ-
uals use the frequency of a publicly expressed value as an indirect measure of its appropriateness
in social settings. Positive social reinforcement of the expressed view acts to strengthen the en-
culturation process. Additionally, individuals identify unacceptable public pronouncements by
either witnessing or directly experiencing the social censure of unpopular expression. When dis-
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approval of a particular expressed value is sufficiently frequent or intense, individuals internalize
the unacceptability of that value as a social fact (Durkheim [1895] 1965). In this way, positive
feedback and social censure act as reinforcement mechanisms that condition the attainment of
particular cultural variants (Bandura 1977). However, internalizing the norms of appropriate
social behavior does not necessarily indicate the internalization of congruent internal attitudes.
Critically, norms of public expression can and often do run counter to privately held individual
preferences. Public compliance with the expressed opinions of others with whom one interacts is
considered to be a type of social conformity that results from a cultural evolutionary process of
conformist transmission.
The Model
I now present a model of the public expression of attitudes with respect to race that accounts for
the features of non-homophilic social interactions (including interracial interactions) structured
by institutions and the preferences of individuals to conform to the behaviors of others with
whom they are socially connected. The purpose is to capture the types of intimate interactions
that would have been forced upon a particular population following a policy shift toward the
desegregation of institutions. Following Akerlof (1980) and Jones (1984), I represent the social
status of agents by the utility that they derive from behaving in accordance with others. But as in
Bernheim (1994) and Kuran (1995), preferences for conformity must be balanced by preferences
to exhibit behavior that is consistent with internal values.1
Formally, let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents represented as the nodes of a graph, g ∈ G (N),
where G (N) is the set of all undirected graphs on N . Agent i ∈ N is characterized by a fixed,
two-element vector (vi, ri), where vi ∈ [0, 1] and ri ∈ {0, 1}. Specifically, the social context to
which the model is intended to apply is characterized by a racial hierarchy and racial separation.
Parameter vi represents agent i’s internal values with respect to the question of racial equality,
such that values closer to 1 represent a preference for the maintenance of the racial hierarchy and
1In other words, the balance is between conformity with others and consistency between internal values and
expressed behavior. For a similar take on a different phenomenon, Bednar et al. (2010) and Page, Sander, and
Schneider-Mizell (2007) use the same terminology of conformity and consistency to develop models of the balance
between conformity with others and internal consistency across a variety of issue dimensions.
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values closer to 0 represent a preference for empowerment of the less powerful group. Parameter
ri represents the racial group to which agent i belongs, with ri = 1 indicating that agent i belongs
to the more powerful group and ri = 0 indicating that agent i belongs to the less powerful group.
Each agent in the population is forced to select some publicly observable behavior b ∈ B ≡
{0, 1}. Agents have intrinsic preferences over B represented by the payoff function f (bi, vi), where
f (·) achieves a maximum when vi = bi and is assumed to be symmetric. In addition, agents have
extrinsic preferences over B represented by the payoff function h (bi, φi, g), where h (·) achieves a
maximum at bi = φi and is assumed to be symmetric, and where φi is a summary representation
of agent i’s estimate of the behaviors of others in her neighborhood (to be explained below).
Given the assumptions imposed on f (·) and h (·), a convenient representation is to let f (bi, vi) =
− (bi − vi)2 and h (bi, φi, g) = − (bi − φi)2. Agent i chooses bi to solve maxbi∈B U (bi, vi, φi, g),
where
U (bi, vi, φi, g) = f (bi, vi) + h (bi, φi, g)
= − (bi − vi)2 − (bi − φi)2 .
The form of U (·) shows that it is simply a convex combination of intrinsic and extrinsic payoffs.
For a specified number of time steps, agents are ordered according to their social status as
determined by their extrinsic payoff in the previous period, and in this order each chooses an
observable behavior. Let S ≡ σ (N) = (s1, . . . , sn) be a permutation of N that lists agents in
descending order according to their status. For example, suppose in a population of three agents
that agent 3 has the highest status, agent 1 the second highest, and agent 2 the lowest. We would
then have S = (s1, s2, s3) = (3, 1, 2). In a given time step, after each agent sj chooses bsj her
action is observable by all other agents in her neighborhood of direct connections. Therefore, any
agent sk such that j < k and sj ∈ Nsk (g) will be able to incorporate the observation of bsj into
her estimate of the distribution of behaviors in the neighborhood, φsk . A further assumption is
imposed to capture a particular feature of interracial vs. intraracial interactions. That is, agents in
the dominant group having internal preferences for the maintenance of racial inequality take into
account only intraracial connections when considering how the distribution of behaviors will affect
their social status. Agents in the dominant group having internal preferences for racial equality,
on the other hand, take into account all of their connections, regardless of race. Formally, for
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any graph g ∈ G (N), let Ni (g) denote the neighborhood of direct connections and N ′i (g) the
neighborhood of direct intraracial connections. Also, let mi be the total number of agents in the
direct neighborhood and m′i be the total number of agents in the direct intraracial neighborhood
of agent i. Then, at time step t, agent i = sk develops an estimate of the distribution of behaviors
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Substantively, the form of φsk shows that agents establish an estimate of the distribution of
behaviors in the population by observing others who have gone before them in the current round,
and combining this with the information from the entire neighborhood in the previous round.
After all agents in N choose a behavior to solve maxbi∈B U (bi, vi, φi, g), each receives an actual
payoff of U (bi, vi, pi, g). That is, the extrinsic payoff actually received is based on the average
behavior of other agents in agent i’s neighborhood of direct connections rather than the estimate
employed to choose a behavior. Agents’ extrinsic payoffs in time t then determine the order in
which agents choose behavior in time t+1, and so on. The operation of the model dynamics can
be summarized as follows.
1. Define N = {1, . . . , n} and choose g ∈ G (N).
2. For each i in 1 through n, assign vi ∈ [0, 1], bi ∈ {0, 1}, and an initial status, q0 ∈ [0, 1].
3. Define S = σ (N) = (s1, . . . , sn) so that agents are placed in descending order according to
their social status.
4. Agents s1 through sn calculate φsj and choose bsj to solve maxb∈B U (bi, vi, φi, g).
5. Agents receive payoff U (bi, vi, pi, g) and h (bi, pi, g) becomes agent i’s current status.
6. Repeat steps 3 through 5.
11
Figure 1: Example networks with N = 17 and k = 5 (left) and N = 16 and k = 4 (right).
Numerical Experiments
A set of numerical experiments were constructed to explore variation in some of the key features
of the social context that are expected to impact the distribution of expressed behaviors in the
population over time. Graphs were constructed to ensure the presence of cliques of varying size.
Specifically, a base clique size, k, was chosen so that every agent in the population was randomly
assigned to at least one clique of size k, and one individual in each clique was assigned to two
cliques of size k. The resulting networks of social interactions take the form of those presented in
Figure 1. These contrived examples depicts two societies: one of 17 agents assigned to base cliques
of size 5, with agents 5, 9, and 13 having been assigned to two cliques; the other of 16 agents
assigned to base cliques of size 4, with agents 4, 7, 10, and 13 having been assigned to two cliques.
The purpose of random assignment is to capture non-homophilic interactions and the purpose of
random assignment to cliques is to capture an important feature of schools, workplaces, and other
social settings that structure social interactions. That is, institutions composed of many actors
will structure interactions around tasks that must be performed, and those tasks will call for
certain interactions to be intimate and others to range from casual to non-existent. Additionally,
certain agents will have more social connections than others.
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All of the experiments described herein used a population of 200 agents. Since the intention
is to capture the effects of movement from segregated to desegregated institutions, the popula-
tion was initially composed only of members from the dominant (majority) racial group. Agents’
internal values, represented by the parameter v, were drawn from a truncated (0,1) normal dis-
tribution with a mean of 0.55 and a standard deviation of 0.1. The purpose of this choice was
to slightly skew the internal values of the population toward the maintenance of racial hierarchy,
but at the same time ensure that the bulk of agents fall into the moderate range of the distribu-
tion. The model was then allowed to iterate for several periods so that a behavioral norm among
the dominant group and the associated social status for individuals could develop endogenously.
Then after several periods, a small number of agents from the less powerful (minority) group were
introduced to replace agents of the dominant group. In other words, the total number of agents
was unchanged with the introduction of members of the less powerful group. The model was then
allowed to iterate a specified number of time steps, and the network of connections was reformed
every several periods.
Figure 2 presents a summary of results from a set of experiments in which a small percentage
of agents from the less powerful group and the base clique size were varied. Agents from the
less powerful group were introduced after 5 periods and the network of connections was reformed
every 5 periods thereafter. Plots present the first 100 iterations. For each percentage of agents
from the less powerful group and base cliques size combination, 100 simulations were performed.
Lines on the plots indicate the average behavior of the society for each simulation.
Scanning Figure 2 across rows illustrates the effect of increasing the base clique size while
holding the size of the minority population constant. The starkest pattern arises for the cases in
which the minority population was defined as 2.5% of the overall population. In these experiments,
the population quickly settles into an equilibrium in which all agents choose behavior 0, or in which
all of the agents of the minority race choose behavior 0 and all of the members of the majority
race choose behavior 1. The distribution of average behaviors across simulations provides clear
evidence that the system is biased toward the latter equilibrium, and this is increasingly apparent
as the size of the base cliques to which agents are assigned increases. Indeed, in the case of
2.5% minority agents, 19% of simulations settled on the equilibrium in which all agents choose
13




























































































































































































































































Figure 2: Simulation experiments of first 100 iterations, varying size of minority population and
base clique size. Each line depicts average population behavior for one simulation; each panel
depicts 100 simulations.
behavior 0 when the base clique size was 4, whereas when the base clique size is increased to
5 or 8, this percentage dropped to 11 and 5, respectively. This provides preliminary evidence
that small social groups have greater potential than large groups to provide agents with sufficient
reputational incentives to espouse a view of racial equality. To say this another way, large social
groups create a great deal more uncertainty and a substantially lower likelihood of blacks making
up a significant fraction of agents’ neighborhood of direct connections. Greater uncertainty causes
agents to more often have to use their past observations of the distribution of behaviors in the
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population to formulate estimates of what a neighbor will do in the future. Due to initial biases in
the distribution of values, this process of using past behavior to predict future behavior becomes
a self-reinforcing dynamic that overwhelmingly leads to the behavior associated with a preference
for inequality. And it is important to keep in mind that this is true even with most agents falling
in the moderate range with respect to internal preferences.
The same phenomenon holds true when the minority population is defined at 5% or 7.5%.
In either case, holding the proportion of the population from the minority group constant and
increasing the base clique size leads the simulated populations to settle into equilibrium far more
quickly and for the equilibrium selected in the overwhelming majority of cases to be the one in
which all agents from the majority group choose behavior 1.
Scanning down columns of Figure 2 paints a similar picture. In each column, as the base clique
size is held constant and the size of the minority population is increased, more and more simulated
sets of agents select the equilibrium associated with behavior 0. That is, given a constant base
clique size, increasing the size of the minority population that is introduced has a substantial
impact on the propensity of the society to choose the behavior 0 equilibrium.
Across all simulation experiments, the most interesting cases from the perspective of norm
selection are the cases in which populations of agents that had seemingly settled into the equilib-
rium associated with behavior 1 suddenly found it worthwhile to abandon their previous choice
and transition toward the equilibrium associated with behavior 0. Substantively, these represent
the cases in which social pressures to act in a way consistent with racial inequality were turned on
their head, and began to operate in the opposing direction. These transitions only occurred when
either the base clique size took on its lowest value (4) or the percentage of the population from
the less powerful group took on its highest value (7.5). The combination of these two features in
the bottom left of Figure 2 shows far and away the greatest number of transitions from a norm at
b = 1 to a norm at b = 0. Figure 3 depicts several examples of these norm transitions, focusing
on three particular combinations of minority population size and base clique size.
In all of these cases, the most interesting point from a substantive perspective is that the
initial movement from a norm of behavior 1 to a norm of behavior 0 is driven by a sudden drop
in the social status of some formerly high status individuals. However, remaining in the behavior
15




















































































Figure 3: Example average population behavior depicting a transition from a behavior 1 equilib-
rium to a behavior 0 equilibrium using three parameter combinations.
0 equilibrium is driven by individuals with internal preferences close to 1 actually leading the
way in exhibiting behavior 0. That is, given the initial distribution of values, with a substantial
number of individuals carrying a preference for inequality, a minority population of no more than
7.5%, and regular rewiring of the network of social connections, the only way that an equilibrium
at behavior 0 can be sustained is by groups of individuals with an internal preference for behavior
1 acting concertedly to exhibit the opposite behavior. Much like the results of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, though all would be better off in terms of intrinsic utility if they could coordinate their
efforts around behavior 0, they nonetheless collectively exhibit behavior 1 due to the previous
exhibitions of behaviors combined with uncertainty about future distributions.
Conclusion
Norms of public discourse with respect to the equality of the races have undergone sweeping
changes over the course of American history. Whereas it was once a virtual requirement within
most white social circles to express a preference for the maintenance of white hierarchy due
to the presumption that the races were inherently unequal, exactly the opposite is true today.
Regardless of what individuals may truly believe, expressions consistent with the ideas that one
race is inherently superior or that the white hierarchy should be maintained are now wholly
unacceptable in most white social circles. It is clear that expressions in favor of racial inequality
may occur and remain acceptable within self-selected groups of like-minded individuals, but in
16
the types of casual interactions that make up the bulk of day-to-day social communications for
most individuals such expressions may now severely damage one’s reputation. The historical
trajectory of this change is difficult to summarize in a concise manner, having been subject to
wide geographic and temporal variability, but it can be safely claimed that the pace of change
in the latter half of the twentieth century was particularly brisk. Coinciding with that brisk
pace was a monumental shift in public policies with respect to institutions that structure social
interactions.
In this paper, I have attempted to provide a formal account of some of the underlying indi-
vidual and structural mechanisms that could have plausibly brought about such changes. The
model presented above provides a simplified and abstract representation of the changes in the
nature of interracial interactions that resulted from policies on the desegregation of formal insti-
tutions. The key feature of those interactions is that they are non-homophilic, both interracial
and intraracial. When combined with individual preferences for conformity, non-homophilic in-
teractions are expected to carry the potential for individuals forced to express an opinion on a
sensitive social issue to potentially put forth a view that is incongruent with internal preferences.
If such a phenomenon takes place on a wide scale, the general implication is that norms of public
discourse can shift in such a way that perhaps even a majority of individuals that make up a
society consistently express opinions that differ from what they truly believe.
The most interesting implication derived from the numerical experiments, and one that was
not expected ahead of time, is that a transition from a behavior largely congruent with internal
values to one that is largely incongruent is greatly facilitated by assigning individuals to small
groups of non-homophilic interactions. That is, holding preferences, network structure, and racial
makeup constant, smaller base clique sizes are more likely to lead the population to a transition
in norms from the behavior consistent with a preference for inequality to a behavior consistent
with a preference for equality. In retrospect, this result makes sense and can be easily explained.
Substantively, smaller social groups should be expected to be more intimate, and lead to a greater
chance for interracial contacts. Small numbers of individuals in combination with interracial
contacts should be more likely to lead those individuals from the dominant group with a preference
for maintaining inequality to experience a decrease in social status as a result of lower uncertainty
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about the distribution of preferences and the chance of being outnumbered. Formally, smaller
numbers of individuals in groups should result in a greater chance of groups of individuals with
a preference for equality being put together simply due to small-sample variability and chance.
This, in turn, would lead to a higher probability of individual neighborhoods transitioning from an
inequality norm to an equality norm, and the reformation of links leading to widespread changes
in individuals’ estimates of the distribution of preferences in the broader population.
Future research will investigate empirically the validity of the individual-level mechanisms that
underly the formal model and further explore the relationship between the size of groups to which
individuals are assigned and the likelihood of a norm transition. Additionally, the formal model
can be further complicated in a variety of ways that may lead to additional insights with respect
to norm transitions. At present, the results of the numerical experiments are promising in that
they are plausible and in that they provide a straightforward avenue toward experimental studies
to explore their tenability. Further investigation of the assumptions underlying those results is
surely needed.
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